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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency cost of transfers. 
To this end, we develop a model of individual demand decisions about the provision of 
a regional public good that encompasses a continuum of tax/transfers scenarios to 
finance regional public expenditure. We assume that individuals have identical quasi-
linear preferences defined over private consumption and the regional public good, that 
endowment income varies between individuals and regions and that regions have 
different predetermined sizes. We show that, despite its simplicity, this model is capable 
of discriminating the efficiency properties of the different scenarios considered, and that 
the substitution of transfers for own regional taxes always raises the provision of the 
regional public good. Our model yields the so called “flypaper effect” with no need to 
appeal to the existence of “fiscal illusion” by the part of the individual. We nevertheless 
find that “fiscal illusion” increases the elasticity of public good provision with respect to 
transfers, and we suggest two potentially refutable hypotheses to identify the existence 
of this phenomenon.  
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1. Introduction 
Arguably, one of the most important problems regarding the design of federal 
systems is the allocation of revenue sources among different levels of government, so 
that expenditure responsibilities can be adequately financed. Theoretical alternatives 
range from the attribution to each jurisdiction of its own taxes, to the attribution of all 
taxes to the central jurisdiction together with the implementation of transfers to finance 
subcentral levels of government (henceforth “regions”). In practice, no federal country 
applies any of these two pure models. Normally, own regional taxes play a 
predominant, but not exclusive role. They tend to be complemented by central 
government transfers aimed at diverse objectives, such as the compensation of 
horizontal and vertical fiscal gaps, the correction of externalities, the promotion of 
regional development and the imposition of national minimum standards in the 
provision of particular regional services.
2
 
The literature on fiscal federalism has dealt extensively with this subject. The 
identification of taxes that are susceptible of being decentralized is a recurrent topic 
since the seminal contribution by Musgrave (1983).
3
 Also, the work by Gordon (1983) 
opened an extensive literature on the consequences of the use of distortionary taxes by 
regional governments, among which we find the emergence of fiscal externalities, both 
horizontal (tax exporting and fiscal competition between regions) and vertical (due to 
the sharing of tax bases by the central and regional levels of government).
4
 The other 
main area of growing interest is the typology, purpose and economic effects of 
intergovernmental transfers, with particular attention to equalizing grants and to the 
flypaper effect.
5
 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency cost of transfers. This is a 
modest endeavour compared with the contributions cited above, but nevertheless a 
necessary task that, in a sense, deals with a question previous to the issues considered 
above. There is a wide agreement in the literature on the prevalence of taxes over 
                                                 
2
 See Shah, ed. (2007) and Boadway (2012). 
3
 For a recent discussion of the tax assignment problem see Boadway and Shah (2009). 
4
 Recent treatments of these topics can be found in Wilson (2006), Dahlby (2008, ch. 9) and Boadway and 
Shah (2009). 
5
 Buchanan (1950) and Musgrave (1961) are the two seminal contributions on equalising transfers. 
Boadway and Shah (2009) offer a complete analysis of the theory and practice of interjurisdictional 
transfers. We return to the flypaper effect below in this work. 
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transfers among the instruments of regional finance. The standard political argument is 
that own taxes make it possible the fiscal autonomy of regions and, from an economic 
point of view, it is argued that taxes force regional governments to be fiscally 
accountable before its electors, a circumstance that favours the efficient provision of 
public goods and services.
6
 Transfer finance, on the other hand, weakens fiscal 
autonomy and accountability and leads to wrong decisions concerning public 
expenditure. Our objective in this paper is to formalize this argument in a systematic 
manner and to identify the efficiency gains associated with own regional taxes with 
regard to other formulas, such as all transfer or mixed tax/transfer methods of regional 
finance. As far as we know, this has not been done before. 
To this end, we develop a model based on individual demand decisions concerning 
the level of the regional public good, where individuals have identical quasi-linear 
preferences defined over private consumption and a regional public good, and where 
only endowment income varies between individuals and regions. Regions, on the other 
hand, have different predetermined sizes. This is admittedly a very simple model, but 
we show that it is sufficient to make the efficiency properties of the several scenarios 
considered visible. This is done in the context of non distortionary taxation, but we 
argue as well that the results obtained are very likely to hold in an economy in which 
taxes impose an efficiency cost. If the “flypaper effect” is defined as the increase in 
public good provision as the result of substituting transfers for own regional taxes, then 
our model yields this effect with no need to appeal to the existence of “fiscal illusion” 
by the part of the individual. We nevertheless find that “fiscal illusion” increases the 
elasticity of public good provision with respect to transfers, and we suggest two 
potentially refutable hypotheses to empirically identify the existence of this 
phenomenon.  
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we identify the reference point that 
will be used all along the paper: the Pareto efficient provision of the regional public 
good. In Section 3 we develop a model that generates a continuum of tax/transfer mix 
scenarios and use this framework to analyse their efficiency under the collective 
decision rule of simple majority. In this model, the transfer is a given fraction of the 
cost of the public good. This section is complemented with an Annex in which we 
extend the results of Section 3 to an economy with distortionary taxation. In Section 4 
                                                 
6
 Here, again, the literature is huge. See, for all, Bird (1993). 
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we consider a variant of the tax/transfer mix, in which the transfer is independent of the 
level of provision of the public good. We show that when an exogenous transfer is used 
along with marginal taxation by regions, and under certain restrictions, these two 
sources of revenue are interchangeable and Pareto efficiency is achieved. In Section 5 
we review other scenarios of interest ―tax revenue sharing and tax sharing 
complemented with own regional taxes― and show that they can be assimilated to 
some of the basic scenarios considered in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 6 we define the 
concept of “fiscal illusion” and apply it to the different scenarios identified in the paper. 
We show that fiscal illusion does not have an effect in all circumstances, but that there 
are certain scenarios in which a flypaper-type effect arises; in this respect we identify 
two hypotheses which are empirically testable. Section 7 ends the paper with some 
concluding remarks and a summary of the main results obtained. 
 
2. Pareto efficient equilibrium 
Let us consider, as in Persson and Tabellini (2000), a country formed by J regions, 
each with 
jN  individuals. The country’s population is N, where jjN N . Individual 
i of region j has the following quasi-linear utility function 
   ,ij ij jw c H g   (1) 
where 
ijc  is his consumption of private goods and  H   an increasing concave function 
defined over a regionally provided public good with no inter-region spillovers 
jg .
7
 All 
individuals have the same preferences. In all regions, a unit of income can be 
transformed without cost into a unit of the public good. If we denote the cost of the 
public good by  jc g , then  j jc g g , so the marginal cost of providing the public 
good is   1.j jdc g dg   There is no mobility between jurisdictions and the central 
                                                 
7
 The same results we obtain in this paper would follow if instead we considered a publicly provided 
private good.  
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government provides a national public good 
cg  that is financed with a lump sum central 
tax paid by the total country’s population.8 
To obtain the efficient level of provision of 
jg , the regional government maximizes 
the sum of utilities of region j’s inhabitants with respect to 
jg  
   ,
j
j ij ij j j
g
i i
Max W w c N H g     
subject to the resource constraint: 
 ,j ij ij
i i
g c y    
where 
ijy  is the individual’s endowment income, ijm , net of the lump sum central tax. 
That is,  ij ij cy m g N  . Since our interest is on the level of provision of the regional 
public good, in what follows we take the tax 
cg N  as given and work directly with ijy . 
Substituting the resource constraint into 
jW , the expression to be maximized is 
  ,j ij j j j
i
W y g N H g    
and the first order condition is 
  1 0,j j g j
j
dW
N H g
dg
     
or 
   1,      .j g jN H g j    (2) 
At the efficient level of provision, jg
 , the sum over all J inhabitants of the marginal 
rates of substitution between the public good and private consumption will equal the 
marginal cost. This is the Samuelson (1954) condition and constitutes the reference 
position that we shall use in this exercise to evaluate the different tax/transfer structures 
under consideration. 
                                                 
8
 The existence of a national public good is not crucial to our argument, and could perfectly well be 
ignored, assuming that the only central government responsibility is to raise national taxes in order to 
fund transfers to the regions. 
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Notice that with quasi-linear preferences the efficient amount of the public good is 
independent of the level of private consumption. This is readily seen in (2), which 
determines a unique level of 
jg  with independence from the optimal level of ijc . 
Another implication of this assumption is that income effects are zero as far as the 
efficient amount of the public good is concerned. 
Can this social optimum be obtained as the result of individual behaviour and 
majority rule? In what follows, we explore this question using the simple model 
developed above and in the context of several alternative ways of financing the regional 
public good. 
 
3. A model of the tax/transfer mix 
3.1. Lump sum tax finance 
Suppose that in general regional governments finance their public expenditure by 
means of own taxes and transfers from the central government. In this section we 
consider that only lump-sum taxation is available to both levels of government in order 
to collect their own taxes or to fund transfers. Transfers from the central government are 
a compensatory mechanism to help regional governments to pay for their expenditure; 
that is 
 ,  ,j js g j   (3) 
where   is the fraction of the cost of the regional public good that is covered by the 
transfer, 0 1  .9 
 With lump-sum finance, the budget constraint faced by individual i of region j is 
 ,
j j
ij ij
j
g ss
c y
N N

    
Where s is the total transfer and s N  the lump-sum tax that the central government 
collects from all national residents in order to fund this transfer. Given this transfer, the 
regional government finances the uncovered cost of the public good by means of a 
                                                 
9
 At this level of generality, transfers can be thought of as open-ended and, given  , dependent on the 
optimal level of jg . Mathematically, the parameter   is a shift parameter that measures the relative 
importance  of transfers in the regional finance system. 
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lump-sum tax  j j jg s N  levied on the residents of the region. Using (3), this budget 
constraint can be rewritten as 
  1 ,jij ij
j
gg
c y
N N
      
where jjg g , or 
  
1 1
1 .ij ij k j
k j j
c y g g
N N N

 

 
     
  
  (4) 
Expression (4) tells us that, in general, the budget constraint faced by the individual has, 
in the  ,ij jc g  space, a vertical intercept equal to 
 ,ij k
k j
y g
N


   
and a constant slope, the absolute value of which is 
  
1 1
1 .
jN N
    
This framework allows us to identify the following three finance scenarios. 
 
Own regional tax scenario 
If 0   ―that is, there is no transfer and the region finances its public good by 
means of a lump-sum tax levied on its residents― then (4) gets reduced to  
 ,
j
ij ij
j
g
c y
N
   (5) 
which is the steepest budget line of Figure 1, with vertical intercept ijy  and slope 
(absolute value) 1 jN .
10
 
Substituting (5) into the individual’s utility function (1), we have 
                                                 
10
 Unless indicated otherwise, in what follows slopes are always measured by means of their absolute 
value.  
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  .jij ij j
j
g
w y H g
N
    
His demand for the public good will satisfy the first order condition 
  
1
0,
ij t
g j
j j
dw
H g
dg N
     
or 
   1,  ,tj g jN H g j   (6) 
where t
jg  is the level of provision of the regional public good demanded by individuals 
when this good is financed with a regional lump sum tax.  
 
 
Figure 1: Tax/transfer mix equilibriums 
 
 
A 
C 
ijc
jg
 
ijy
 
1
ij k
k j
y g
N 
 
t
j jg g
   s
jg
1 jN
1 N  B 
ij k
k j
y g
N


 
ts
jg
 
1 1
1
jN N
  
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Comparing (2) and (6) we conclude that t
j jg g
 . The social optimum emerges as an 
equilibrium if the public good is financed with a regional lump sum tax.
11
 See also that 
this is the demand of all individuals in region J. Under the assumption of identical quasi 
linear preferences there is unanimity concerning the demand of the public good, which 
in Figure 1 is represented by point A. 
 
 
Transfer scenario 
If 1   ―that is, the regional government obtains all the finance needed through a 
transfer from the central government― then (4) gets reduced to 
 
1
,
j
ij ij k
k j
g
c y g
N N
     
which is the flattest budget line in Figure 1, with vertical intercept  ij kk jy g N   
and slope 1 N . In this case, the individual’s indirect utility is 
  
1
,
j
ij ij k j
k j
g
w y g H g
N N
     
and the level of provision of the public good, sjg ,  must satisfy the first order condition 
  
1
0,
ij s
g j
j
dw
H g
dg N
     
or 
 
1
( ) .sg jH g
N
   
Multiplying both sides of this expression by jN  we have 
 ( ) ,  ,
js
j g j
N
N H g j
N
   (7) 
                                                 
11
 See Bowen (1943), Casahuga (1982), and Brennan and Buchanan (1983). 
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and comparing (2) and (7) it follows that ,  sj jg g j
  , since 1jN N  . All regions over 
provide the regional public good in comparison with the Pareto efficient level. This is 
point C in Figure 1. 
We have here the familiar common-pool problem:
12
 each region internalizes the 
whole of the benefits generated by its own public good, but, as finance is shared with 
other regions, it only internalizes a fraction 
jN N  of the marginal cost. Transfer 
finance, therefore, generates financial irresponsibility by the part of the region, while 
keeping its autonomy in deciding the level at which the public good must be provided. 
Tax/transfer mix scenario  
Finally, if 0 1   ―that is, if regional finance is obtained by a mix between own 
tax and transfer from the central government― then the relevant budget constraint is the 
same expression (4). The tax-price of the public good faced by the individual is a 
weighted average of the tax-price associated to the all transfer scenario, 1 N , and that 
associated to the own tax scenario, 1 jN , where the weighting factor is the transfer 
coverage parameter  . This is the middle budget line of Figure 1, with vertical intercept 
 ij kk jy g N    and slope     1 1 1 jN N   . 
Substituting (4) into the individual’s utility function we have 
    
1 1
1 ,ij ij k j j
k j j
w y g g H g
N N N

 

 
      
  
  
with first order condition 
    
1 1
1 ,tsg j
j
H g
N N
     
or 
   1 1 ,  .jtsj g j
N
N H g j
N

 
    
 
 (8) 
This is equilibrium B in Figure 1. If transfers have an element of compensation 
linked to the provision of the regional public good, their introduction into the system, 
                                                 
12
 The so called “1/N law”. See Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981). 
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even if they are complemented with taxes, will generate a distortion in the tax-price, and 
generate an over provision, of the public good. The distortion, and therefore the over 
provision, will be larger the more important is the transfer in relation to the cost of the 
public good; that is, the larger is the parameter  . Thus, as Figure 1 shows, 
t ts s
j j j jg g g g
    .
13
 
See also that in this model tax and transfer are not interchangeable. The more 
important transfers are as substitutes for own regional tax, the greater is the divergence 
of the public good tax-price from the level that would generate the efficient solution at 
point A. 
 
3.2. Proportional income tax finance 
The same results follow if all the revenue from the private sector has to be obtained 
with a proportional income tax. Then, the individual’s budget constraint is 
   ,ij ijij ij j j
j
y y
c y s g s
y y
     
where j ij
i
y y  and j
j
y y .  ijy y s  is the individual’s tax liability to the central 
government to fund the transfer, and   ij j j jy y g s  the individual’s liability to the 
regional government to finance the part of the public good cost not covered by the 
transfer. 
Using (3), the budget constraint can be rewritten as 
  1 1 ,ijij ij j
j
yg
c y g
y y
 
 
    
 
 
or 
                                                 
13
 In equilibriums B and C, ―that is, whenever there are transfers― at the regional and individual levels, 
income effects may appear. Exclusively in order to provide an unencumbered presentation, in Figure 1 we 
rule out these income effects, which is equivalent to assuming that j jg g N N  when finance is lump-
sum, and j jg g y y  when it is proportional to income. This allows us to draw equilibriums B and C on 
the steepest budget line. In both cases, however, and even if the above proportionality results do not hold, 
the resource constraint is fulfilled, as it should be, at the economy wide level. In the case of own regional 
taxation, the resource constraint is always fulfilled: not only at the economy wide level, but also at the 
regional and individual levels.   
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  1 1 .
k
k j ij ij
ij ij j
j
g
y y
c y g
y y y
  

 
  
      
   
 

 (9) 
Expression (9) is the equivalent of expression (4) when the only available tax is 
proportional to income, and the three scenarios follow from the corresponding values of 
 . 
 
 
 
Own regional tax scenario 
If 0  , the individual’s budget constraint (9) gets reduced to 
 1 .
j
ij ij
j
g
c y
y
 
   
 
 
The public good is financed by the regional government applying a constant rate 
j jg y  
to individual income 
ijy . In terms of Figure 1, this would be the steepest budget line, 
with vertical intercept 
ijy  and slope ij jy y . 
Thus, individual preferences are given by 
  1 ,jij ij j
j
g
w y H g
y
 
    
 
 
and the level of provision of the public good that maximizes individual utility satisfies 
the following first order condition: 
   0,ij ij g j
j j
dw y
H g
dg y
     
or 
   .ijg j
j
y
H g
y
  
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Under majority rule, the equilibrium level of provision of the public good will be 
determined by the preferences of the voter with median income, 
mjy . That is, 
   .mjtg j
j
y
H g
y
  
If 
ijy  is symmetrically distributed so that mj jy y , where jy  is the regional mean 
income, the equilibrium level of provision is also 
  
1
,
j
jt
g j
j j
y
N
H g
y N
   
or 
   1,  .tj g jN H g j   (10) 
If, as assumed, mean income equals median income, the equilibrium level of provision 
of the public good financed with a regional proportional income tax will be the same as 
the social optimum level defined in (2). That is, *t
j jg g . 
This corresponds to point A of Figure 1, although the figure now would only 
represent the median voter. The vertical intercept of the steepest budget line would now 
be 
mjy , and the slope mj jy y , which under the assumption that mjy y  equals 1 jN . 
 
Transfer scenario 
If 1  , expression (9) reduces to 
 1 .
k
k j ij
ij ij j
g
y
c y g
y y

 
 
   
 
 

 
Individual i’s preferences are now  
  1 ,
k
k j ij
ij ij j j
g
y
w y g H g
y y

 
 
    
 
 

 
with first order condition 
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   0,ij ij g j
j
dw y
H g
dg y
     
or 
   .ijg j
y
H g
y
  
In this case, the decisive voter is that with the median level of income over the 
region. That is, 
   .mjsg j
y
H g
y
  
If median income is equal to mean income, 
mj j
y y , the equilibrium level of provision 
is 
  
1
,
j
j js
g j
j
y
N y
H g
y y N
   
or 
   1,  .jsj g j
y
N H g j
y
    (11) 
Comparing (2) and (11) it follows that ,  sj jg g j
  . Regions over provide the regional 
public good. 
If for region J median income is equal to the country wide average income, 
mjy y , 
the equilibrium level of public good individually demanded is given by 
  
1
.sg j
y
NH g
y N
    
Multiplying both sides of the equation by jN , this condition can be rewritten as 
 ( ) ,      .
js
j g j
N
N H g j
N
   (12) 
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Since 1jN N  , region j over provides the regional public good: ,  
s
j jg g j
  . See also 
that expressions (7) and (12) coincide. Thus, if
mjy y , the equilibrium regional policy 
will be independent of the type of tax used to fund the transfer; if 
mjy y  the 
equilibrium provision of the public good will be larger when the transfer is funded with 
a proportional income tax than when it is funded with a lump-sum tax, and vice versa 
when 
mjy y . 
In terms of Figure 1, equilibrium (12) corresponds, as it was the case with lump-sum 
finance, with point C, only that in this case it only applies to the median voter and the 
parameters of the budget line are measured differently. The vertical intercept of the 
flattest budget line would now be  1 ,mj kk jy g y    and the slope mjy y , which 
under the assumption that 
mjy y  is, as in Figure 1, equal to 1 N . 
 
Tax/transfer mix scenario  
If 0 1  , the individual’s budget constraint is the same expression (9) and, in this 
case, the indirect utility function is 
   1 1 ,
k
k j ij ij
ij ij j j
j
g
y y
w y g H g
y y y
  

 
  
       
   
 

 
with first order condition 
    1 .ij ijg j
j
y y
H g
y y
     
In this case, the decisive voter that generates the equilibrium condition is 
    1 .mj mjg j
j
y y
H g
y y
     
If within the region median and average income are equal, 
mj j
y y , the equilibrium 
level of provision is 
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    
1 1
1 ,
jts
g j
j j
y
H g
y N N
     
or 
   1 1 ,  .jtsj g j
y
N H g j
y

 
    
 
 (13) 
Since   1jy y  , condition (13) equates the social marginal benefit to a social marginal 
cost which is less than 1, thereby generating an over provision of the regional public 
good. Further, if
mj j
y y y  , the equilibrium level of the public good is 
    
1 1
1 ,tsg j
j
H g
N N
     
or 
   1 1 ,  ,jtsj g j
N
N H g j
N

 
    
 
 (14) 
which is the same as condition (8). Thus, if 
mj j
y y y  , the equilibrium provision of 
the public good will be independent of the type of tax used to fund the transfer; if 
mjy y  the equilibrium provision will be larger when the transfer is funded with a 
proportional income tax than when it is funded with a lump-sum tax, and vice versa 
when 
mjy y . 
Figure 1 can also handle this equilibrium at point B, only that now the middle 
budget line would have a vertical intercept equal to  1 ,mj kk jy g y    and a slope 
equal to     1mj mj jy y y y   , which under the assumptions held about the 
distribution of income reduces to     1 1 1 jN N   , exactly the same as that 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
3.3. Summary of results 
Figure 2 shows, in the demand/supply space, the level of provision of the regional 
public good of each scenario. The reference case is the Pareto efficient equilibrium, 
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where the regional public good, 
jg
 , is provided up to the point where aggregate 
demand, the sum over all regional residents of the marginal rates of substitution 
between the public good and private consumption ―we call this concept the sum of 
marginal benefits, 
iji
MB ― equals aggregate supply, the total marginal cost of 
provision, 
ii
MC , which under the assumptions of our model is equal to 1. 
The equilibrium level of provision coincides with the Pareto efficient equilibrium in 
the case of own regional tax finance, t
jg  ―conditions (6) and (10). There is however 
over provision in the case of the tax/transfer mix scenario, ts
jg  ―conditions (8) and 
(14)― and in the transfer scenario, s
jg  ―conditions (7) and (12). Also, the degree of 
over provision increases as we go from the own tax scenario to the transfer scenario. 
Given that   1jN N  , it must be the case that t ts sj j j jg g g g    .14 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of alternative regional finance scenarios 
                                                 
14
 The results of Section 3 are all obtained under the assumption of non distortionary taxation. It is 
therefore pertinent to ask to what extent they would change should the recourse to this type of taxes be 
not available. This opens a wide area of analysis (see for instance Dahlby, 2008) which would take us far 
away from the purpose of this article. We nevertheless present in the Annex to this work a simple 
extension of the tax/transfer mix model used here that takes into account the efficiency cost of taxation. 
Using a representative individual assumption, and therefore abstracting from distributional 
considerations, we show that the qualitative results obtained above are maintained when taxes affect 
negatively the level of individual income.   
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4. Exogenous transfer finance 
Notice that in the above model, the transfer is defined as a given fraction   of the 
equilibrium provision level of the regional public good. If the transfer is assumed to be 
completely independent of the level of provision of the regional public good, then 
results are quite different from those obtained in the mix tax/transfer scenario of Section 
3. In particular, the determining element is then again the marginal own tax and, under 
certain conditions, full Pareto efficient results are obtained. 
Both models capture some elements of reality, and both are abstractions that miss 
particular features of actual finance systems. For instance, in the model of Section 3 we 
have assumed that the parameter   is the same for all regions, while a regional specific 
parameter may be more realistic. On the other hand, the complete exogeneity of the 
transfer is difficult to defend in the light of the equalising nature that these transfers use 
to present in real finance systems. In any case, and for the purpose of completeness, we 
develop in this section a tax/transfer scenario with the transfer exogenously determined. 
,  ij iji iMB MC   
jg
1 
jN N
 
,  tj jg g
  sjg
ts
jg
A 
B 
C 
1 1
jN
N

 
  
 
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Consider a system in which the exogenously determined fixed transfer to region j, 
js , does not cover the whole of the cost of the public good. That is, j js g .
15
 As in 
Section 3, we consider both lump-sum and proportional income taxation to finance this 
transfer and the rest of the public expenditure. 
 
4.1. Lump-sum taxation 
Suppose that to finance all the 'sjs  transfers the central government collects from 
the whole country’s population a lump sum tax equal to  1 N s , where jjs s . 
Since ,  j js g j  , region j additionally collects a lump-sum tax to finance the 
uncovered part of the cost of the public good equal to   1 .j j jN g s  The individual’s 
preferences are now: 
    
1 1
,ij ij j j j
j
w y s g s H g
N N
      
and the demanded level of public good will satisfy the first order condition 
  
1
0,
ij
g j
j j
dw
H g
dg N
     
or 
 
   1,t e sj g jN H g   (15) 
where  
t e s
jg  is the equilibrium level of provision of the public good when the 
exogenous transfer is complemented in the margin with own regional taxation. This 
structure of finance, therefore, does effectively generate the provision of the efficient 
level of the public good,  
t e s
j jg g
 . 
However, despite the fact that expression (15) is the same as expression (6), the 
present tax/transfer equilibrium is not in general the same as that discussed in Section 3. 
The individual’s budget constraint in this case is 
                                                 
15
 In principle, js  could be greater than jg , but then the regional tax would be negative. That is, the 
regional government would give a hand out to the residents of that region. 
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1
.
j
ij ij j
j j
ss
c y g
N N N
 
     
 
 (16) 
That is, the tax/transfer scenario leaves the tax-price of the public good unchanged, but 
introduces in general an income effect, the sign of which, as Figure 3 shows, depends 
on how the transfer is distributed among regions. This circumstance has no effect on the 
demand of the public good if, as is the case in our model, preferences are quasi-linear. 
With this utility function, the income effect on the public good is zero, all pure 
variations in income being absorbed by the consumption of the private good. But for a 
more general utility function, a pure variation in income would change the consumption 
of both private and public goods. 
 
                      Figure 3: Tax/(exogenous) transfer mix and quasi-linear preferences 
 
This raises some interesting questions regarding both the design of the transfer 
system and the equivalence between the tax and the tax/transfer scenarios. Even if 
preferences are quasi-linear, the equivalence between the tax and tax/transfer 
equilibriums will only refer to the provision of the public good, but not to the 
consumption of the private good. If preferences are not quasi-linear, there will be no 
equivalence in the consumption of either private or public good. Perfect equivalence 
between the two scenarios only holds when the total transfer is distributed among 
ijc
jg
 
ijy
 
j ijN y
 t e st
j j jg g g
    
1 jN
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regions according to relative population,  j js N N s . In that case, the income effect 
disappears and the budget line of all regions is exactly the same as the one considered in 
Section 3.1 for the own regional tax scenario; that is, the continuous budget line of 
Figure 3. If the total transfer is not distributed according to relative population, there 
will be regions in which the income effect will be positive ―those for which 
 j js N N , represented in the figure by the upper dotted budget line― and others in 
which it ill be negative ―those for which  j js N N , represented by the lower 
dotted budget line. 
 
4.2. Proportional income taxation 
Suppose now that both central and regional governments finance, respectively, the 
transfer and the uncovered gap with a proportional income tax. Then the individual’s 
indirect utility function is: 
    .ij ijij ij j j j
j
y y
w y s g s H g
y y
      
The first order condition is 
   0,ij ij g j
j j
dw y
H g
dg y
     
or  
   ,ijg j
j
y
H g
y
  
and, under majority rule, if 
mj j
y y , the equilibrium level of provision of the public 
good in this case is 
 
   1,  .t e sj g jN H g j   (17) 
Again the mix tax/transfer is efficient,  
t e s
j jg g
 . 
Figure 3 also represents this median voter equilibrium but then the vertical intercept 
of the budget line is    1 ,mj j jy s y s y     and the slope mj jy y , which for the 
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assumptions used above equals 1 jN . Now, the tax and tax/transfer scenarios are fully 
equivalent when the transfer is distributed among regions according to relative income, 
 j js y y s . Only in that case does the income effect cease to exist and for all regions 
the relevant budget is the continuous line of Figure 3. 
 
5. Other scenarios of interest 
Sections 3 and 4 do not exhaust the possible scenarios of interest, although the 
remaining ones can be shown to be identical to the alternatives that we have already 
considered in this paper, albeit with some changes in nomenclature. Again for 
completeness, we make in this section some brief considerations on these other 
scenarios. 
 
5.1. Tax revenue sharing 
Sharing the revenue raised by a central tax in order to finance the provision of a 
regional public good is the same as using transfer finance. Suppose the central 
government collects a nation-wide proportional income tax to finance both its own 
national public good and all the regional public goods. If region j shares on this revenue 
so that its public good 
jg  can be financed, the individual share cannot be other than 
 ijy y g . But this is equivalent to the case of a transfer financed with a proportional 
income tax, and therefore the demand of the regional public good must be (12). And the 
same is true if instead of a proportional income tax, a lump sum tax is considered. Then 
the individual share needed to finance the regional public good would be  1 N g  and 
the demand for the public good would be given by (7), the one corresponding to a 
transfer financed with a lump-sum tax. 
Tax sharing has been advocated as a form of participation by regions in potentially 
large tax bases, in which the central government has a larger comparative advantage in 
efficient exploitation than regions. Apart from this, perhaps the only other advantage 
that tax revenue share has over transfers is that individuals may be more aware of what 
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it is that they are really financing with their taxes, and thus make more unlikely the 
incidence of the phenomenon of fiscal illusion that we discuss below.
16
 
 
5.2. Own taxes/shared taxes finance 
The tax/transfer mix results are immediately applicable to a scenario in which own 
taxes complement not an exogenous transfer from the central government, but an 
exogenously fixed share of the central tax. It is easy to show that in this scenario the 
Pareto efficient equilibrium can also be reached, whether taxes are lump-sum or 
proportional to income. 
This is a widely used structure in practice. For instance, the Spanish regional finance 
system combines the three types of revenue considered in this paper. In addition to 
transfers, Spanish autonomous communities have the revenue obtained from a set of 
ceded taxes. Some of these are real own regional taxes in that autonomous communities 
can decide, subject to certain restrictions, tax rates and some elements of the taxable 
base; this is the case, for instance, of the personal income tax and the inheritance tax. 
Other ceded figures fall squarely into the category of tax-sharing, as communities 
receive the revenue raised in their territory but have no responsibility whatsoever in 
establishing the corresponding tax liability: this is the case of VAT and excises.
17
 
 
 
 
6. Fiscal illusion 
Fiscal illusion has frequently been associated with the so called “flypaper effect”. If 
this is defined as the increase in public good provision resulting from the substitution of 
transfers for own regional taxes, then, as can be seen in Section 3, our model yields this 
effect with no need to appeal to the existence of “fiscal illusion” by the part of the 
individual. In our model, which is resource constrained, the equivalence Bradford and 
                                                 
16
 Spanish experience on the effect of tax revenue sharing on the perception of regional taxpayers is not 
very encouraging. Surveys systematically show that a significant percentage of people is not capable of 
correctly identifying the level of government responsible for major taxes and public services. See, for 
instance, Área de Sociología Tributaria (2011) and López-Laborda and Rodrigo (2012).   
17
 See Zabalza and López-Laborda (2011). 
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Oates (1971) result does not apply: transfers and own regional taxes are not 
interchangeable as far as their effect on the demand of the public good.
 
We nevertheless 
think that in federal finance “fiscal illusion” may play a role important enough to merit 
attention, and therefore consider in this section what the consequences of this 
phenomenon would be for the three scenarios contemplated in Section 3.
 18
 
 
6.1. Tax/transfer mix scenarios with fiscal illusion 
The continuum of scenarios examined above assumes a high level of fiscal 
perception by the part of the individual. Among the taxes paid to the central 
government, one is able to differentiate between that levied to fund the transfer to the 
regions and that levied to finance the national public good. This, however, may no be 
the case. The individual may suffer from “fiscal illusion” and fail to distinguish between 
the two types of tax paid to the central government and, therefore, fail as well to see the 
link between any of these taxes and the level of public good. 
If 0  , there is no possibility of confusion as the individual pays only one tax to 
the central government; namely, concentrating our explanation only on lump-sum tax 
case,
19
 the tax destined to finance the national public good 
cg N , which is already 
incorporated in the term 
ijy . The other tax paid, j jg N , is collected by the regional 
government, and thus, according to our definition of fiscal illusion, does not generate 
any misperception. The budget constraint is still limited by the steeper line in Figure 1 
and therefore nothing changes as far as the equilibrium is concerned. In terms of our 
model, the own taxation scenario is not compatible with fiscal illusion. 
If 0 1  , the overall tax revenue collected from the individual by the central 
government is composed of that coming from the tax destined to finance the national 
                                                 
18
 The “flypaper effect” is defined as the differential effect that transfers have on regional public good 
provision as compared with the response elicited by increases in disposable income. According to Hines 
and Thaler (1995), Arthur Okun coined the label because the money that the central government sends to 
the regions “sticks where it hits”. The first pieces of empirical evidence on the existence of the flypaper 
effect are due to Henderson (1968) and Gramlich (1969). For a review of the wide theoretical and 
empirical literature on this effect see Bailey (1999, ch. 11) and Gamkhar and Shah (2007). As Hines and 
Thaler (1995) point out in their survey, there have been two general strands of enquiry to explain this 
effect. One is based on the behavior of bureaucrats interested in maximizing the size of their department’s 
budget, and the other on the existence of some sort of misperception (“fiscal illusion”) by the part of 
individuals.  
19
 The effect of fiscal illusion is the same whether we consider lump-sum or income proportional taxation. 
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public good, 
cg N  plus that coming from the tax destined to finance the transfer to the 
regions,  jj g N  . Thus the budget constraint that the individual perceives is 
 
1
,ij ij j
j
c y g
N

   
where 
 
1
.ij ij c j
j
y m g g
N

 
    
 
  
The individual obviously knows what the amount of tax exacted from him by the 
central government is, namely  1 c j
j
N g g
 
 
 
 , but because of fiscal illusion, he 
cannot distinguish between 
cg  and j
j
g , nor therefore see the link between the 
regional public good and the compensatory transfer received by the regional 
government. The whole of 
ijy  is thus perceived as an exogenous variable unrelated to 
the provision of the regional public good, and the first order condition that the 
demanded level of the regional good,  
ts fi
jg , will have to satisfy is 
 
    
1
0,
ij ts fi
g j
j j
dw
H g
dg N

     
or 
 
   1 ,  .ts fij g jN H g j    (18) 
The perceived social marginal cost is less with than without fiscal illusion as 
 1 1 1 .
jN
N
 
 
    
 
 
Therefore, fiscal illusion worsens the distortion of compensatory transfers and thus the 
over provision of the regional public good:  
ts fi ts
j jg g .
20
 
                                                 
20
 Oates (1979) advances a model of “fiscal illusion” that is closely related to the one presented here but 
not identical. First, he adopts a partial equilibrium approach because he ignores the funding of the central 
government transfer. Second, Oates’ particular definition of fiscal illusion involves individuals confusing 
the average and marginal tax-price of the public good. Our definition, on the other hand, relies only on the 
26 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
Finally, if 1  , the possibility of confusion by the part of the individual is at a 
maximum. The perceived budget constraint in this case is 
 ,ij ijc y  
where 
 
1
.ïj ij c j
j
y m g g
N
 
    
 
  
The budget line becomes horizontal, and equilibrium is reached at a point of tangency 
with the corresponding indifference curve where both the marginal rate of substitution 
is zero and the resource constraint is satisfied. The level of provision of the regional 
public good,  
s fi
jg , satisfies then the condition 
 
   0,      ,s fij g jN H g j    
and  
s fi s
j jg g . Individuals internalize the benefits of the regional public good, but 
erroneously perceive that it has a zero tax-price. 
This is obviously an extreme and unlikely occurrence, which should make us reflect 
on the nature of the fiscal illusion assumption. This result would lead to a large demand 
of the public good but, and this is important to note, also to a too small, perhaps 
unsustainable amount of private consumption.
21
 The illusion-distorted marginal tax 
price is the signal that compels the consumer to demand that much public good, but the 
opposite effect on private consumption caused by the scarcity of resources is a reminder 
to the same consumer that something may be wrong with his perception as to what is 
the true tax-price of the public good. Fiscal illusion may be real enough in situations in 
which economic agents have to deal with several interrelated government levels, but 
this argument suggests that it must necessarily be a local phenomenon. Fiscal illusion 
                                                                                                                                               
inability to distinguish the use of taxes when the taxing government uses more than one tax and is, in 
some sense, more removed from the taxpayer than the regional government. See also Courant, Gramlich 
and Rubinfeld (1979). They use the same definition of fiscal illusion as Oates, but take into account the 
funding of the central government transfer. 
21
 In a more general model it could also lead to a sub optimal consumption of the national public good: 
See Logan (1986). 
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cannot persist for large changes; it must correct itself as the consequences of large 
changes are born by the consumer.
22
 
 
6.2. The empirical relevance of “fiscal illusion”: some illustrative calculations 
Figure 4 shows the effect of fiscal illusion in the tax/transfer mix scenario. In this 
case, equilibrium with fiscal illusion is at point B , with a larger level of provision of 
the public good than would be the case without fiscal illusion. 
The increase in the public good depends on the elasticity of demand for the public 
good with respect to social marginal cost. Let us suppose for simplicity that this 
elasticity is constant over the relevant range and equal to 
gc , then the relative change in 
the level of provision of the public good, 
j jdg g , is 
 .
j
gc
j
dg dMC
g MC
  
On the other hand, from (14) and (18) 
 
 
 
.
1 1
j
j
N NdMC
MC N N


 
   
 
Therefore, 
 
 
 
.
1 1
jj
gc
j j
N Ndg
g N N



 
   
 (19) 
The fraction on the right hand side of (19) is positive  0 :1  and increasing in coverage 
factor and region size. Thus, since 0gc  , 0j jdg g  . 
 
         Figure 4: The effect of fiscal illusion 
                                                 
22
 See also that in this argument, the general equilibrium nature of the model plays an important role. We 
are essentially dealing with substitution effects. Income effects, when present, are very small. Thus, when 
testing empirically the presence of fiscal illusion, demand responses should be estimated holding real 
income constant. 
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What we want to ascertain is whether the responsiveness of public expenditure with 
respect to transfers increases with fiscal illusion. In our model, an increase in   
measures by definition a substitution of transfers for own regional taxes. Without fiscal 
illusion, the elasticity of public expenditure with respect to  , g , is 
 
 
 
1
.
1 1
j
g gc
j
N N
N N


 

   
   
 (20) 
Whereas with fiscal illusion, this elasticity is 
 .
1
fi
g gc

 

 

 (21) 
Therefore, the differential response of public good provision on transfer increase due to 
fiscal illusion is 
 
 
    
,
1 1 1
jfi
g g gc
j
N N
N N
 

  
 
  
    
 (22) 
 
or, using (19), 
,  ij iji iMB MC   
jg
1   
 ts fi
jg
ts
jg
B 
B
C 
1 1
jN
N

 
  
 
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1
.
1
jfi
g g
j
dg
g
  

 

  
Table 1 presents, in percentage terms, values for expressions (20), (21) and (22) for 
an assumed demand elasticity of -0.5 and different values of   and jN N . 
 
Table 2: The effect of fiscal illusion 
 0.5gc    
 
jN N  
  0.05 0.10 0.20 
 
g  
0.3 0.20 0.18 0.16 
0.5 0.45 0.41 0.33 
0.7 0.99 0.85 0.64 
 fi
g  
0.3 0.21 0.21 0.21 
0.5 0.50 0.50 0.50 
0.7 1.17 1.17 1.17 
 fi
g g   : Differential effect 
0.3 0.01 0.03 0.06 
0.5 0.05 0.09 0.17 
0.7 0.17 0.32 0.53 
 
These are illustrative calculations, but fall within the range of empirically estimated 
effects (Fisher, 1982), particularly if we take into account that they refer, as we believe 
it should be, to resource compensated effects. From the second panel, it is clear that the 
existence of fiscal illusion generates a demand response that increases with the size of 
the transfer but is unaffected by region size. This is a potentially testable hypothesis to 
ascertain the existence of fiscal illusion since, as can be observed in the first panel, 
without fiscal illusion the demand response, although it also increases with respect to 
transfer size, it decreases with the size of the region. Indeed, this is precisely what 
expressions (20) and (21) suggest: a) Without fiscal illusion, the responsiveness of 
demand for the regional public good with respect to transfers depends on both the 
fraction that the transfer represents of total public expenditure and the relative size of 
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the region. And b) with fiscal illusion, the responsiveness of demand for the regional 
public good with respect to transfers depends only on the fraction that the transfer 
represents of total public expenditure. 
In the context of our model, we can also be more precise as to the relationship 
between transfer elasticity, region and transfer size. Figure 5, which is based on 
expression (20), shows how, holding constant the relative size of the region, the 
elasticity without fiscal illusion increases very slowly if the transfer is relatively small, 
but very fast as the transfer becomes larger and larger. Also, for a given coverage 
fraction of the transfer, the larger is the region the smaller should the elasticity be. In 
short, without money illusion these two variables ― region and transfer size ― interact 
with each other in a multiplicative fashion. This is again a testable proposition. 
 
Figure 5: The influence of transfer and region size on elasticity 
 
 
6.3. Fiscal illusion and the tax/exogenous transfer mix scenario 
For the same reasons discussed with respect to the own regional tax scenario, the 
mix scenario with an exogenous transfer complemented with a regional tax, considered 
in Section 4, is not compatible with money illusion. In that scenario the transfer exerts a 
mere income effect. Therefore, confusing the destination of the two taxes paid by the 
individual to the central government has no effect on the tax price of the public good. 
The equilibrium with fiscal illusion is the same as that without fiscal illusion discussed 
above. 
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Things would be different, of course, if the definition of fiscal illusion given above 
in Section 6.1 was enlarged to include, not only the failure by the part of the individual 
to distinguish between the two taxes paid to the central government, but also the 
mistaken perception of considering the exogenous transfer linked to the provision of the 
regional public good. But this would lead us to an analysis identical to the case 
considered in Section 6.2, and at the cost of lowering significantly the explanatory 
power of our definition of fiscal illusion. We thus prefer to leave this definition free of 
additional elements that belong more properly to the institutional setting of the system 
of finance than to the sphere of individual perceptions. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this paper has been to evaluate in terms of efficiency the most 
relevant finance scenarios open to regional governments. In particular, we have 
considered the following alternative forms of regional finance: own regional taxes; 
transfers from the central government; and transfers complemented with own regional 
taxes. 
The model used to evaluate these different scenarios is based on individual demand 
decisions concerning the level of the regional public good, where individuals have 
identical quasi-linear preferences defined over private consumption and the regional 
public good, and where only endowment income varies between individuals and 
regions. This is admittedly a very simple model, but we show that it is sufficient to 
discriminate between the efficiency properties of the different scenarios considered. 
The equilibrium level of provision coincides with the Pareto efficient equilibrium in 
the case of own regional tax finance, but there is over provision if there is a transfer 
from the central government that is a given fraction of the cost of the demanded public 
good. We show that the degree of over provision increases as the coverage fraction of 
the transfer increases. If, on the other hand, the transfer is independent of the level of 
provision of the public good, efficiency is re-established providing that this transfer is 
marginally complemented with an own regional tax. Although the basic model from 
which these results are obtained assumes non distortionary taxation, we argue in the 
Appendix that these results are likely to hold also in a situation in which taxes have 
efficiency costs. 
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We use this model to define formally the concept of fiscal illusion as the failure by 
the part of the individual to distinguish between the different taxes he pays the central 
government, and therefore the different types of expenditure they finance. We show that 
the own regional tax scenario is not compatible with fiscal illusion as defined here, 
whereas the tax/transfer scenario yields a higher demand for the public good with than 
without fiscal illusion. The model suggests two hypotheses, both of them potentially 
testable, according to which without fiscal illusion, the responsiveness of demand for 
the regional public good with respect to transfers depends on the relative size of both 
the transfer (in a positive way) and the region (in a negative way), whereas with fiscal 
illusion the responsiveness of demand for the regional public good depends only 
(positively) on the fraction that the transfer represents of total public expenditure. We 
also argue that fiscal illusion must necessarily be a local phenomenon, which is likely to 
correct itself when the consumer becomes aware of the global implications (namely, the 
cost in terms of lost private consumption) of misperceiving the tax-price of public 
goods. 
McLure (1983) is right when he reminds us of the differences between theoretical 
recommendations and the real world. The distribution of resources between different 
levels of government does not take place in a void. There are many historical, political, 
geographic and cultural factors that end up playing a significant role in determining the 
distribution of tax responsibilities assigned to subcentral governments. The weight of 
own taxes in regional governments will not be the same in a country in which 
decentralization has proceeded from top to bottom, than in another were the process has 
been the other way around. Still, we feel that theoretical analysis, such as the one 
developed here, may help us not only to understand the essential elements of the 
problem at hand, but also, by enabling us to identify the cost of suboptimal financial 
configurations, to gain an idea of the importance that economic agents place on these 
other historical and cultural factors. 
 
Annex 
A tax/transfer mix model with distortionary income taxation 
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How would the results of Section 3 above be altered if we consider distortionary 
taxation? The answer is “not much” if, keeping in the line of maximum simplicity 
adopted in this article, we abstract from distributional considerations. 
Let us suppose that we have an economy of identical individuals, all with the same 
level of income iy . They live in J territorial jurisdictions, populated with jN  
inhabitants  1,...,j J . That is, we have an economy with J identical representative 
consumers, each living in a jurisdiction of different predetermined size. Taxation 
imposes an efficiency cost: the higher the rate of taxation 
jt  is, the lower the level of 
individual income will be. This effect is the same for all individuals. Other than these, 
all the assumptions used in the main text are maintained here. 
We start with equation (9), which given the new assumptions and notation reads: 
  1 1 ,
i i
i i
k k j j
k j j
y y
c y t f t y
y y
  

  
      
    
  (A.1) 
where ,  j j jt g y j  , 
i
j jy N y , k kf y y , 
iy Ny  and jjN N . 
Substituting (A.1) into (1), the representative individual’s indirect utility function is 
    1 1 ,
i i
i i
k k j j j j
k j j
y y
W y t f t y H t y
y y
  

  
       
    
  (A.2) 
and, assuming no cross tax effects between regions, the first order condition for the tax 
rate that maximises welfare 
        
1 1
1 1 1 1 0.
i i
k k j g jk
j j j
W y
t f y H y
t t N N

     

 
         
  
  
or, 
    
 
1 1 1
1
j
j g j k kk
j
N
N H g t f
N t

 

 
     
 
 , (A.3) 
where    is the elasticity of personal income with respect to the income tax rate,  
 ,
i
j
i
j
ty
t y



  
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which following Dahlby (2008) we assume to hold constant over the relevant range of 
analysis. We further assume that 0   and, to ensure that a change in the tax rate 
increases revenue, that 1  . 
Given these assumptions, to see the difference that distortionary taxation makes 
with respect to the optimal allocation, expression (A.3) must be compared with 
expression (8). The new term that appears in the first order condition is 
  
 
1 ,
1
k kk
j
t f
t



 

  
which is positive. With distortionary taxation, the sum of marginal benefits has to be 
equated to an aggregate marginal cost  dMC  that is higher than the one associated to 
lump sum taxation  lsMC . Other things equal, the more distortionary the tax is, the 
larger the difference between  and d lsMC MC . Thus, with distortionary taxation, the 
level of provision of the public good is lower than the level associated to lump sum 
taxation. 
Expression (A.3) is the general case, where   0 1    measures the tax/transfer 
mix. If 0  , the provision of the regional public goods is financed only with own 
regional taxes. In that case, we have from (A.3) that 
  
 
1 .
1
j g j
j
N H g
t


 

 (A.4) 
This is greater than 1, the value of the aggregate marginal cost with lump sum finance 
case ―see expression (6) above. Again, with respect to the lump sum finance case, the 
provision of the regional public good is reduced. 
Finally, if 1  , the regional public good is financed only with transfers, and the 
condition becomes 
    
 
1 ,
1
j
j g j k kk
j
N
N H g t f
N t


  

  (A.5) 
which is greater than jN N , the marginal cost with lump sum finance ―see expression 
(7) above― and thus yields again a lower level of provision of the regional public good. 
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It is easy to show that the marginal cost associated to these three expressions, keeps 
the same ordering as that found in the lump sum finance case. In particular, partially 
differentiating the right hand side of (A.3) with respect to   we find that the marginal 
cost decreases as the transfer represents a higher proportion of total finance: 
 
 
1 0.
1
d
j
k k
k j j
NMC
t f
N t
 
 
 
     
 
  
Therefore, the result that the provision of the public good increases as we substitute 
transfers for own regional taxation is maintained with distortionary taxation. In this 
case, however, we cannot assert that the all tax equilibrium  0   coincides with the 
Pareto efficient equilibrium, as it was the case with lump sum finance. 
 
References 
[1] ÁREA DE SOCIOLOGÍA TRIBUTARIA (2011): “Opiniones y actitudes 
fiscales de los españoles en 2010”, Documentos No 09/11, Madrid: Instituto de 
Estudios Fiscales. 
[2] BAILEY, S. J. (1999): Local Government Economics. Principles and Practice, 
London: MacMillan. 
[3] BOADWAY, R. (2012): “International Lessons in Fiscal Federalism Design”, 
eJournal of Tax Research, 10 (1): 21-48. 
 (http://www.asb.unsw.edu.au/research/publications/ejournaloftaxresearch/Docu
ments/paper3_v10n1_Boadway.pdf) 
[4] BOADWAY, R. and A. SHAH (2009): Fiscal Federalism. Principles and 
Practice of Multiorder Governance, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
[5] BOWEN, H. R. (1943): “The interpretation of voting in the allocation of 
resources”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 58: 27-48. 
[6] BIRD, R. M. (1993): “Threading the fiscal labyrinth: Some issues in fiscal 
decentralization”, National Tax Journal, 46 (2): 207-227. 
[7] BRADFORD, D. F. and W. E. OATES (1971): “The analysis of revenue sharing 
in a new approach to collective fiscal decisions”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 85: 416-439. 
[8] BRENNAN, G. and J.M. BUCHANAN (1983): “Normative tax theory for a 
federal polity: some public choice preliminaries”, in Ch. E. McLURE, ed.: Tax 
assignment in federal countries, Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal 
Financial Relations, The Australian National University, pp.52-65. 
[9] BUCHANAN, J. M. (1950):”Federalism and fiscal equity”, American Economic 
Review, 40 (4): 583-599. 
36 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
[10] CASAHUGA, A. (1982): “La invalidez general del teorema de la 
descentralización”, Cuadernos Económicos del ICE, 20: 37-51. 
[11] COURANT, P. N., E. M. GRAMLICH and D. L. RUBINFELD (1972): “The 
stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants: or why money sticks where it 
hits”, in P. MIESZKOWSKI and W.H. OAKLAND (eds.): Fiscal Federalism 
and Grants-in-Aid, Washington: The Urban Institute. 
[12] DAHLBY, B. (2008): The Marginal Cost of Public Funds. Theory and 
Applications, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
[13] FISHER, R. C. (1982): “Income and Grant Effects on Local Expenditure: The 
Flypaper Effect and other Difficulties”, Journal of Urban Economics, 12: 324-
345. 
[14] GAMKHAR, S. and A. SHAH (2007): “The Impact of Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Transfers: A Synthesis of the Conceptual and Empirical Literature”, in R. 
BOADWAY and A. SHAH, eds.: Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: 
Principles and Practice, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, pp. 225-258. 
[15] GRAMLICH, E. (1969): “State and Local Governments and their Budget 
Constraint”, International Economic Review, 10: 163-182. 
[16] GORDON, R. (1983): “An optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (4): 567-586. 
[17] HENDERSON, J. (1968): “Local Government Expenditures: A Social Welfare 
Analysis”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 50: 156-163. 
[18] HINES, J. J. JR., and R. H. THALER (1995): “The flypaper effect”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 9: 217-226. 
[19] LOGAN, R. R. (1986): “Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government”, Journal 
of Political Economy, 94: 1304-1318. 
[20] LÓPEZ-LABORDA, J. and F. RODRIGO (2012): “Percepciones de los 
ciudadanos sobre las haciendas regionales: quién es y quién debería ser 
responsable de los servicios e impuestos autonómicos”, XIX Encuentro de 
Economía Pública, Santiago de Compostela, 26 and 27, January 2012. 
[21] McLURE, Ch. E. (1983): “Introduction: the revenue side of the assignment 
problem”, in Ch. E. McLURE, ed.: Tax assignment in federal countries, 
Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, The Australian 
National University, pp. xii-xix. 
[22] MUSGRAVE, R. A. (1961): “Approaches to a Fiscal Theory of Political 
Federalism”, in Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic 
Research, ed. (1961): Public Finances, Needs Sources, and Utilization, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press and NBER, pp. 97-133. 
[23] MUSGRAVE, R. A. (1983): “Who should tax, where and what?”, in Ch. E. 
McLURE Jr., ed.: Tax Assignment in Federal Countries, Canberra: Centre for 
Research on Federal Financial Relations, The Australian National University, 
pp. 2-19.  
[24] OATES, W.E. (1972): Fiscal Federalism, Nueva York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 37 
 
[25] OATES, W.E. (1979): “Lump-Sum Grants have Price Effects”, in P. 
MIESZKOWSKI and W.H. OAKLAND (1979): Fiscal Federalism and Grants-
in-Aid, Washington: The Urban Institute. 
[26] PERSSON, T. and G. TABELLINI (2000): Political Economics. Explaining 
Economic Policy, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
[27] SAMUELSON, P. (1954): “The pure theory of public expenditure”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 36: 387-389. 
[28] SHAH, A., ed. (2007): The Practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative 
Perspectives, pp 288-316, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University 
Press. 
[29] WEINGAST, B., K. SHEPSLE and C. JOHNSEN (1981): “The Political 
Economy of Benefit and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive 
Politics”, Journal of Political Economy, 89(4): 642-664. 
[30] WILSON, J. D. (2006): “Tax competition in a federal setting”, in E. AHMAD 
and G. BROSIO, eds.: Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, pp. 339-354. 
[31]  ZABALZA, A. and J. LÓPEZ-LABORDA (2011): “The new Spanish system of 
intergovernmental transfers”, International Tax and Public Finance, 18 (6): 750-
786. 
